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There are large differences across transition countries with respect to agricultural-sector 
performance and corresponding scope of farm restructuring and shift to individual farming.  
In this paper we analyze the impact of individualization on productivity growth within an 
augmented neo-classical growth model framework.  This approach allows us to circumvent 
criticisms on the grounds of lack of theoretical and objective criteria for inclusion of 
explanatory variables.  Furthermore, in the empirical analysis using a panel data covering 15 
transition countries over the period 1990-2001 and applying a GMM-IV estimator we are 
able to control for the impact of various factors and the potential endogeneity of variables.  
Our estimation results are robust and support the view that the shift to individual farming, as 
well as the overall economic reforms, have positively contributed to the productivity growth 
in agriculture during the first decade of transition.   
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A current policy objective of the governments in transition countries is to increase 
productivity and growth.  This objective is motivated by the process of integration into the 
European Union and the high competition faced in the global markets.  Recent country 
assistance strategies and structural adjustment loans from the World Bank (e.g., World Bank, 
2001a and 2001b) have pushed these governments to reduce subsidies and price 
interventions, and impose hard budget constraints by letting the private sector control 
production and marketing. 
Economic reforms and enterprise restructuring have induced important output and 
productivity changes in the agricultural sectors of transition countries.  However, there are 
large differences across countries with respect to productivity growth, measured as the 
growth of agricultural output per worker, and the corresponding scope of farm restructuring 
and shift to individual farming, defined as the share of country’s total agricultural land (TAL) 
cultivated and/or managed individually.
1  For example, cumulative productivity growth, after 
ten years of reforms in Czech Republic is 70% with corresponding level of individualization 
at 26% (see table 1).  While in Albania the individualization level is 90% but the cumulative 
productivity growth is only 10%, for the same period.  Furthermore, in many countries there 
is even decline in agricultural productivity while individualization remained low.  In Russia, 
                                                 
1 The definition of individual farm is by no means uniform and uncontested, however, the individual-farm 
sectors across transition countries have one important feature in common – the management and use of farm 
resources is in individual hands.  There is evidence that the individual farms are gradually differentiating into 
two distinct groups: private (family) farms and household plots.  The private commercially oriented full-time 
individual farms may reach substantial size and are mostly responsible for the observed increase of the average 
size in the individual-farm sectors in transition countries.  Alongside the large private farms are the numerous 
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for example, there is more than 30% cumulative decline of output per worker while the share 
of individual farming is only 13% and collective farms still dominate.
2  Thus it is not 
unambiguously clear from the raw statistical numbers if individualization helps productivity 
growth in agriculture.   
- Table 1 - 
There are only a few studies related to the impact of individualization on agricultural 
performance in transition countries.  Macours and Swinnen (2000a, 2000b) and Lerman 
(2000, 2001) in their analyses of output and productivity changes in agriculture during 
transition find mixed evidence.  Furthermore, there is an ongoing institutional debate 
concerning the effects of individualization as a policy for restructuring former socialist 
countries’ agriculture.  On the one hand, consultants and international institutions, such as the 
World Bank support individualization of agriculture as reform policy that leads to higher 
productivity by solving incentive and organizational problems of collective farms (e.g., 
Deininger, 1993, 1995; Lerman et al., 2002).  On the other hand, a number of local policy 
makers are not convinced in the usefulness of the shift to individual farming and blame this 
policy for fragmentation and disorganization along the supply chain.
3  Therefore contributing 
to this important for agricultural reforms debate is timely and requires more thorough 
investigation.  Clearly, shifting production from collective to individual farms merits 
                                                 
 
household plots.  For such households farming is mostly self-supply activity, and it takes place on a tiny scale.  
Further discussion related to individualization of production in transition agriculture is provided in section 2.   
2 Macours and Swinnen (2002) identify three patterns of transition countries’ agricultural performance as 
measured by gross agricultural output (GAO) and agricultural labor productivity (ALP).  Pattern I (CSH): a 
strong decline in GAO coincides with a strong increase in ALP. This is the pattern followed by Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and Hungary.  Pattern II (RUB): a strong decline in GAO coincides with a strong decline in ALP.  
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus are typical examples, but also, e.g. Moldova, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan 
and Tajikistan fit within this pattern.  Pattern III (CVA): a strong increase in GAO coincides with an, albeit 
slower, increase in ALP.  Examples are China, Viet Nam, and to certain extent, Albania. 
3 There is also a view that individualization of agricultural production leads to subsistence farming, which is 
seen as a survival strategy and usually associated with low productivity (e.g., Sarris et al., 1999; Kostov and 
Lingard, 2002).    3
attention also because it has much wider implications beyond agriculture, specifically for 
rural development, land use and the environment as a whole.   
In this paper we analyze the impact of individualization on agricultural (labor) 
productivity growth using a neo-classical (Solow) growth model framework to specify 
tractable estimation equations.
4  The neo-classical growth model is a natural framework for 
analyzing productivity as it is derived from a production function and links productivity 
(output per worker) growth with capital accumulation, employment growth, and 
technological progress - the (Solow) residual of the regression.  This approach allows us to 
circumvent criticisms on the grounds of lack of theoretical and objective criteria for inclusion 
of various explanatory variables (e.g., Durlauf and Quah, 1999; Brock and Durlauf, 2001).  In 
particular, this criticism seems relevant for the transition growth analyses where the impact of 
major variables affecting growth such as investment, technological and institutional change is 
often not estimated or interpreted appropriately.   
Furthermore, in the empirical analysis using a generalized method of moments with 
instrumental variables (GMM-IV) estimator and panel data covering 15 transition countries 
over the period 1990-2001 we are able to control for unobserved country-specific effects and 
endogeneity of the variables.
5  The panel data approach allows us to isolate the effect of 
capital and labor deepening on the one hand and technological and institutional changes on 
the other, in the process of transition.  Our estimation results are robust to various 
assumptions and support the view that the shift to individual farming, together with 
                                                 
 
4 We use the neo-classical growth model framework, to impose structure and motivate the empirical analysis 
bearing in mind that the original neo-classical growth model is highly aggregative, at economy rather than sector 
level.  We note, however, that rural sectors of most former socialist countries were quite large and isolated from 
the rest of the economy (e.g., Johnson and Brooks, 1983; Cook, 1992).  
5 All previous studies of agricultural sector performance apply pooled or cross-section regressions (Macours and 
Swinnen, 2000a, 2000b; Lerman, 2000, 2001).  There are also several studies analyzing technical or total factor 
productivity across farm types but only in a few transition countries and again using cross-section survey data 
(e.g., Mathijs and Swinnen, 2001; Davidova et al., 2002; Gorton and Davidova, 2004).    4
advancement in general economic reforms, has positively contributed to the productivity 
growth in agriculture during the first decade of transition.  This positive effect is a result of 
both resource reallocation and shift in the efficiency of production.   
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows.  In the next section an overview of 
agriculture in former socialist countries is presented and hypothesis for the impact of 
individualization as a transition policy derived.  In section 3, the methodology and testing 
strategy are developed.  Section 4 describes the data while section 5 reports estimation results 
and offers a discussion in the context of relevant previous research.  Section 6 concludes.  
 
2  The heritage of transition agriculture and hypothesis 
Land reform and farm restructuring are important components of overall economic reforms 
because agriculture’s share in the economies of the former socialist countries has traditionally 
been much higher than in the market economies.  The former socialist countries were also 
more agrarian than non-socialist countries with comparable levels of income per capita.  In 
the pre-transition decade of 1980s, the mean share of agriculture in GDP for former socialist 
countries was 21%, compared with 14% for non-socialist countries with similar per-capita 
income (Lerman et al., 2002).   
A common trend in former socialist countries, pre-reform was that in the 1980s 
growth rates (of both GDP and agricultural output) were significantly lower compared with 
similar non-socialist countries.  In fact this was a continuation of a trend that began in the 
1960s; the annual growth rates of agricultural production in the USSR, for example, dropped 
from 4% in 1966-1970 to 1% in 1981-1985.  This was a particularly alarming trend because 
investment in agriculture continued at relatively high and increasing levels; Soviet 
agriculture’s share in total investment increased from 21% in 1966-1970 to 24% in 1981-  5
1985 (Cook, 1992; Lerman et al., 2002).  New investments in agriculture were thus producing 
decreasing marginal returns and failed to sustain sectoral growth. 
Economic growth in agriculture, as well as in the whole economy, was accomplished 
mainly through increasing the use of inputs and capital, and not through productivity 
increases (Ofer, 1987).  Johnson and Brooks (1983) who analyze the technical efficiency of 
socialist agriculture using data for all fifteen republics of the USSR over 1960-1979 period 
show that the productivity level of socialist agriculture was substantially lower than that in 
market economies.
6  The partial productivity of agricultural land in former socialist countries, 
as measured by the gross output of agricultural products per hectare, was somewhat higher 
than the partial productivity of land in market economies.  However, socialist and market 
economies’ agriculture differed primarily in the productivity of agricultural labor.  For 
instance, labor productivity was lower by a factor of ten or more in the USSR compared with 
the US and Canada.  This low productivity of agricultural labor is clearly a reflection of the 
very high labor use.   
The centrally planned environment was the main cause of inefficiency of socialist 
agriculture.  It insulated the farms from market signals, imposed central targets as a substitute 
for consumer preferences, and allowed farms to function indefinitely under soft budget 
constraints without proper profit accountability (Kornai, 1986).  Besides, efficiency was 
never an important objective in socialist agriculture; meeting production targets at any cost 
was the main priority.  Yet the inefficiency of socialist agriculture also can be attributed to 
two “micro-level” factors, which sharply distinguished socialist agriculture from agriculture 
in market economies.  These are the exceptionally large farm sizes and the collective 
organization of production (Lerman et al., 2002).   
                                                 
6 The gap between productivity levels of the Soviet agriculture and agriculture in market economies reached 
100%-150% depending on the particular estimation scheme used.   6
The strategy of agricultural transition in former socialist countries aimed to improve 
the efficiency and productivity of agriculture by replacing the institutional and organizational 
features of the command economy with attributes borrowed from the practice of market 
economies (Lerman, 1999).
7  The transition agenda formulated in the early 1990’s envisaged 
a transformation from collective to more efficient individualized agriculture as the ultimate 
goal.  It was asserted that individual farmers, once established as independent entities, would 
engage in land-market transactions and optimize the size of the holdings given their 
managerial skills and availability of resources (e.g., Binswanger et al., 1995; Deininger, 
1995; Lerman, 1998; Mathijs and Swinnen, 1998).  This process would lead to increase in 
efficiency and productivity, and ultimately result in growth of incomes.   
Market economies are characterized by the predominance of individual (family) 
farms.  The experience of transition countries shows that individualized agriculture is 
possible without land privatization, and land privatization does not necessarily create 
individual farms (Brooks, 1993; Rizov, 2001).  Yet primarily because of differences in land 
allocation strategies – paper shares versus physical plots – the extent of individual farming in 
most of the CIS republics is substantially lower than in the Central and East European 
transition countries.
8   
The impact of individualization can be seen both at household level and at private 
(family) farm level.  The household plot with average size less than a hectare, after 
enlargement, is mainly a source of food for the household, but 10%-20% of the output is sold 
for cash in local markets.  The cash revenue from these sales augments the income of rural 
                                                 
 
7 Rizov (2003) offers a comparison of advantages and disadvantages of various production organizations in 
agriculture and suggests implications for agricultural transition in former socialist countries.  
8 On average, 16% of agricultural land is cultivated individually in household plots and private (family) farms 
across the CIS republics compared with 63% across the Central and East European transition countries (Lerman 
et al., 2002).     7
households and thus individual farming contributes altogether 40%-50% of the household 
budget (including produce consumed).  Some households increase their plots even further by 
leasing additional land.  Other households pool the land resources of the extended family to 
create relatively large holdings.  Surveys show that the larger the plot, the greater is the 
surplus available for cash sales and the greater the contribution to household income.  For 
example, in CIS republics, although the share of individual farming in land is relatively 
modest (about 16%), its contribution to agricultural production has been steadily increasing 
over time and now approaches 50% of total agricultural output (Lerman et al., 2002).   
Private (family) farms are much bigger than household plots, often cultivating 
hundreds of hectares of land, with or without hired labor, and represent the ultimate 
individualization of agriculture.  They, in most cases, are run by former farm-enterprise 
employees who have decided to leave the collective and face the risks and benefits of large 
scale individual production.  The decision to start up a private farm is affected by individual’s 
traits, which are determined, among other factors, by age, education, and skills as well as 
capital endowments (e.g., Rizov et al., 2001; Rizov and Swinnen, 2004).   
Both the household plots and the private farms are characterized by individual farm 
operation that entails important incentive, efficiency, and resource allocation changes in 
agricultural production.  These changes due to the individualization of land use and 
management certainly affect productivity of agricultural sector, in a major way.  However, it 
has to be recognized that there also are potentially important differences in the efficiency of 
the small household plots and the larger private farms.  The existing efficiency studies, at 
farm level, suggest moderate advantages of large private farms but results by and large are 
inconclusive with respect to comparisons across countries and vary with the definitions used.
9  
                                                 
9 See, e.g., Mathijs and Swinnen (2001), Mathijs and Vranken (2001), Davidova et al. (2002), and Gorton and 
Davidova (2004).    8
Our aggregate country-level data do not allow pursuing this issue further and therefore we 
treat the forms of individualization symmetrically.   
The goal of this paper is to analyze the impact of the shift of land to individual 
farming (measured as a share of TAL) on the aggregate (labor) productivity growth in 
agriculture.  The hypothesis is that individualization would positively influence agricultural 
productivity due to the higher efficiency of the individual (private) farm organization.   
Besides, individualization may also have an indirect effect on agricultural productivity 
growth resulting from more efficient reallocation of resources across farm organizations (and 
economic sectors).  We test empirically this hypothesis in the next section within the 
augmented neo-classical growth model framework.   
 
3  Theory and estimation methodology 
The neo-classical growth model is a natural framework for our analysis given that it is 
derived from a production function (of a country) such that productivity (output per worker) 
is determined by the capital and labor growth rates and the parameters of technology.
10  By 
definition, productivity growth is equal to output growth less employment growth (Solow, 
1956).
11  The underlying production function is: Q=A(t)f(K,L), where Q is output and K and L 
are capital and labor, respectively.  The multiplicative factor A(t) measures the cumulative 
effect of productivity shifts over time.  These shifts are generally affected by institutional 
environment and reforms besides the (exogenous) technological progress.   
Solow (1957) defines shifts (technical change) in the production function as neutral if 
they leave marginal rates of substitution untouched but simply increase or decrease the output 
                                                 
10 One can equally well consider the production function of an economic sector or a firm to derive a sectoral or 
firm growth model, respectively (see e.g., Hall, 1988 and Roeger, 1995).     9
attainable from given inputs.  In reality, however, changes in productivity are compounded 
out of changes in input use, i.e., along the curve representing the production function, and 
shifts of the curve itself.  Problem of distinguishing these two effects arises because not all 
the factors affecting productivity are observable or measurable.  In the framework of cross-
section regressions it is not possible to control for such factors.  Only a panel data approach 
can overcome this problem (see further).  
Implementation of the neo-classical growth model as a panel-data estimation 
framework is commonly done by specifying a Cobb-Douglas production function with labor-
augmenting technological change: Q(t)=[A(t)L(t)]
1-kK(t)
k, where k (0<k<1) is the share of 
capital in output (e.g., Mankiw et al., 1992; Islam, 1995).  L(t) and A(t) are assumed to grow 
exogenously at rates l and a so that L(t)=L(0)e
lt and A(t)=A(0)e
at.  Further, it is assumed that s 
is the constant fraction of output that is saved and invested into the stock of capital, which 
depreciates with a constant rate, d.  The output per worker is defined as q(t)=Q(t)/L(t); note 




lnA(0)-at.  Then the steady state output per effective worker, lnq
e* can be specified in the 
following way:
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However, countries may not be at their steady states or departures from steady states 
may not be random across countries.  The equation describing the out-of-steady-state 
                                                 
 
11 This formulation of productivity is analogous to the ALP measure commonly used in agricultural sector 
performance studies (see e.g., Macours and Swinnen, 2000a, 2000b).  
12 At steady state or on the balanced growth path (see Romer, 1996, Ch.1) each variable of the model grows at a 
constant rate.     10
behavior is derived by considering the distance between the steady state level of output per 
effective worker, q
e* and its actual value, q
e(t) at any point of time in period t (see Islam, 
1995).  This equation represents a partial adjustment process around the steady state, where 
q
e* is determined by s and l, which are assumed to be constant for the entire period t; 
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Equation (2) represents the standard neo-classical growth model relationships and 
predicts that a high savings/investment rate will affect growth positively, whereas high labor-
use rate (corrected by the rate of technological progress and the rate of depreciation) will 
have a negative effect on productivity growth.
13  It is clear that especially during transition, 
reforms and enterprise restructuring will importantly affect savings and employment growth 
rates.  Thus, these rates are likely endogenous to institutional factors.  
Apart from the savings and employment growth rates, equation (2) contains the term 
lnA(t)= ] ) 0 ( [ln at A + .  In reality, this term reflects not just exogenous technology (shifts) but 
also resource endowments, institutions, etc. and is affected by reform policies and 
institutional changes (such as individualization of agriculture, for example).  One way to deal 
with the complex nature of lnA(t) is to assume that it consists of a time-specific component 
and a country-specific component (see further).
14  However, for example, the country-specific 
                                                 
13 In the augmented version of the neo-classical growth model investment in human capital is an additional 
determinant of growth in output per worker.  For discussion on the augmented neo-classical growth model refer 
to e.g., Mankiw et al. (1992) and Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995).  
14 For example, Hall (1988) decomposes the Solow residual as a measure of total factor productivity into a 
firm/industry-specific markup and a time-specific technology factor.    11
component is likely to be correlated with the savings and employment growth rates, 
experienced by the respective countries.   
Possible estimation techniques for the model are cross-section regressions using 
averaged data for long periods (e.g., Barro, 1991; Mankiw et al., 1992) or a dynamic panel 
data approach (e.g., Islam, 1995; Caselli et al., 1996).  Single cross-section growth 
regressions have several disadvantages: (i) the time series are reduced to a single observation 
means and not all available information is used; (ii) it is very likely that single cross-section 
regressions suffer from omitted variable bias; (iii) one or more of the regressors may be 
endogenous.  Within a dynamic panel data framework (e.g., Hansen, 1982; Arellano and 
Bond, 1991) it is possible to account for unobserved country-specific effects and allow for 
endogeneity of the regressors.   
Using the conventional panel data notation, equation (2) can be written as:  
 
it i t it it it it w x q q q ε ν γ β α + + + + + = − − − 1 1 ,        ( 3 )  
 
where qit=lnq(t) denotes productivity (output per worker) for country, i (i=1,…I) in time, t 
(t=2,…T), qit-1=lnq(0) is the level of productivity at the beginning of each period, and xit is a 
vector of regressors such as investment rate and employment growth.  In our empirical 
analysis we also include, in augmented specifications, as proxies for A(t), variables 
measuring the impact of reforms and individualization on productivity.
15  All variables are 
either initial values or average values over each time period.  As discussed earlier, the lnA(t) 
                                                 
 
 
15 In most (empirical) growth studies (see for a review Sala-I-Martin, 1997) a number of socio-economic 
variables are often included in xit.     12
term is further decomposed into a time-invariant, country-specific (unobserved) effect, νi, a 
time-specific effect, wt, and a constant, α.  The random (zero-mean) error term is denoted εit.  
Finally, from equation (3) the dynamic panel data model can be rewritten in the following 
way: 
 
it i t it it it w x q q ε ν γ β α + + + + + = −1 * ,       ( 4 )  
 
where β*=(β+1). 
At this point it is appropriate to emphasize that equation (4) is based on 
approximation around the steady state and captures the dynamics towards the steady state.  
Note that in the single cross-section regression, s and l are assumed to be constant for the 
entire period.  Such an approximation is more realistic over shorter periods of time - in our 
analysis these are one-year intervals.  The panel data setup allows us, after controlling for the 
individual country effects, to integrate the process of transition and (conditional) convergence 
occurring over several consecutive time intervals.   
In order to address inconsistency and endogeneity problems due to (i) omitted 
unobserved (time-invariant) country effects (Hsiao, 1986), (ii) small number of time-series 
periods, T (Nickell, 1981), and (iii) correlations between regressors and νi and/or εit, we 
apply the first differenced GMM-IV estimator.  Taking first differences of (4) eliminates the 
constant and the country specific effects: 
 
it t it it it w x q q ε γ β ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ −1 * .         ( 5 )  
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Assuming that error terms are independent across countries and serially uncorrelated 
(E[εitεip]=0 for p≠t) and that the initial conditions satisfy E[qi,1εit]=0 for t≥2, then values of qit 
lagged two periods or more are valid instruments in the first differenced growth equation.  
This is so because qit-2 and earlier values are generally correlated with ∆qit-1 but not with ∆εit.  
Thus, qit-1 is predetermined with respect to εit, i.e. shocks to productivity in one time period 
are not correlated with initial productivity of this time period.   
If the regressors, xit are strictly exogenous (E[xitεip]=0 for all p,t) then all the past, 
present and future values of xit are valid instruments in each of the differenced equations, 
even if the xit are correlated with νi.  However, it is likely that some of the regressors in our 
model, e.g. policies and/or policy outcomes (capital and labor reallocation rates as well as 
shift to individual farming), may not be strictly exogenous.  There may be a feedback 
mechanism where past shocks to productivity are correlated with current policies and/or 
outcomes.  Maintaining the assumption that current shocks to productivity are uncorrelated 
with current policies would mean that E[xitεip]≠0 for p<t and E[xitεip]=0 for p≥t.  Following 
Arellano and Bond (1991) we can then use values of the predetermined xit lagged one period 
or more as valid instruments in the first differenced growth equation.   
If a regressor is endogenous then we have to allow for correlation between the current 
value of this regressor and current shocks to productivity, as well as feedback from past 
shocks to productivity, i.e. E[xitεip]≠0 for p≤t and E[xitεip]=0 for p>t only.  In this case, valid 
instruments in the differenced equation are values of the endogenous xit, lagged two periods 
or more.  
   14
4  Data and variables 
Our empirical analysis focuses on the experience of a selected sample of 15 transition 
countries,
16 for which comparable agricultural sector annual data are available over the period 
1990-2001.
 17  However, data is not available for all countries for all years, thus making the 
panel unbalanced.  As the sample covers selected countries of the Balkans, Baltics, Central 
Europe and the CIS, and includes the most up-to-date information available, we are able to also 
test whether the main conclusions from previous studies related to agricultural sector 
performance are still valid after more than ten years of transition.  
We measure productivity growth in agriculture in terms of growth in the gross 
agricultural output per worker (ALP).  Contrary to previous empirical studies that focused on 
average changes in the early years of transition (e.g., Macours and Swinnen 2000a, 2000b; 
Lerman, 2000), we consider year-on-year changes in ALP.  By looking at growth rates in 
agricultural production per worker in each country at a given point in time we are able to 
capture the high heterogeneity across countries as it appears from table 1.  
ALP is measured in purchasing-power-parity adjusted US dollars and was calculated by 
using the initial, 1990 level of agricultural GDP obtained from the EBRD database and the FAO 
annual gross agricultural output (GAO) index over the period 1990-2001.   
We explain ALP growth in terms of the main factors identified in equation (2), i.e., 
the initial level of ALP, the changes in the agricultural labor force (adjusted for the rate of 
depreciation and the rate of technological progress) and the savings/investment in the sector.  
In addition, we control for initial conditions and general economic reforms.  Thus the impact 
                                                 
16 The sample includes: Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Ukraine.   
17 The main data sources are the National Statistical Offices, FAO, OECD, EBRD, and the World Bank.     15
of the factor in the focus of this analysis - the individualization of agricultural production – 
can be isolated.  
Due to lack of any other more appropriate measure, we proxy the savings/investment 
rate, s by an index based on the ratio of output and input agriculture-specific prices as reported 
by OECD.  This (ratio) index is a measure of the gross margin, which is closely related to the 
availability of internal funds and thus to the investment rate, especially in environments 
characterized by financial market imperfections.  Gross margin also is a good indicator of how 
profitable the farms and the sector, as a whole, are at the most fundamental level.  Farms with 
higher gross margins will have more money left over to spend on investment.
18  Based on 
information from IMF country reports and statistical appendixes, we assume 20 percent average 
investment rate (see also Lerman et al., 2002), which is then normalized to the gross margin 
index of each country.  
Under conditions of imperfect financial market and credit constraints the sensitivity of 
investment to internal financing is shown to be high (e.g., Fazzari et al., 1988).
19  Moreover, a 
number of studies emphasize the importance of profitability and cash flow for access to 
financing and investment in transition agriculture.  For example, Pederson et al. (1997) and 
Csaki et al. (2001) emphasize the importance of profitability and cash flow problems for the 
perceived “excessive debt burden” of CIS farms and in limiting investment in agriculture.  Other 
examples are 1998 Romanian and 2000 Czech and Slovak surveys, where about 50% of farmers 
                                                 
18 Solow (1957) points out that “ … ideally what one would like to measure is the annual flow of capital 
services, however, due to lacking any reliable year-on-year measure of the utilization of capital, one must be 
content with a less utopian estimate … ” such as the savings or investment rate.   
19 In general, financing of investment can come both from internally generated resources and from (formal or 
informal) loans.  Transition has constrained both sources of financing.  Own financial sources are constrained 
because hyperinflation wiped out savings, and low profitability and cash flow problems have complicated 
generation of funds internally.  Access to external credit is severely restricted as financial institutions are less 
likely to lend to enterprises with low profitability, outstanding debt, and cash flow problems.  In addition, 
institutional problems such as ongoing reforms of the banking system and enterprises, soft budget constraints, 
lack of credit history, high monitoring costs all contribute to the credit supply problems (see e.g., Swinnen and 
Gow, 1999; Konings et al., 2003; Rizov, 2004).     16
identify insufficient income as the key reason for their investment loan applications being 
rejected (Davis et al, 1998 and EBRD, 2002).   
The annual data for agricultural employment is from countries’ National Statistics and 
ILO.  The average employment growth rate, l was computed as the difference between the 
natural logarithms of agricultural employment at the end and beginning of each year.  
It is implicitly assumed, as in other panel data studies (e.g., Islam, 1995; Caselli et al., 
1996) that the rate of technological progress is common to all countries and allowed for 
unobserved country-specific differences in technology.  Assuming that the (initial) rate of 
technological progress is common to all countries can be justified for the economies in transition 
by the fact that there were explicit policies towards equalization of countries within the former 
COMECOM.  Furthermore, the technological-progress component of a reflects primarily the 
advancement of knowledge, which is not country-specific (Mankiw et al., 1992).  
We recognize that the diffusion of new technology is likely to be costly and take a 
considerable period of time (e.g., Kershenas and Stoneman, 1995).  Therefore, if the diffusion of 
new technology is not costless and instantaneous, we may want to also allow for different rates 
of technological progress in different countries.  However, due to lack of data we have to 
maintain the standard assumption of a common rate of technical change as in a number of 
previous studies.  Note that our controls for progress of reforms and restructuring ameliorate this 
restriction to certain extent.  Thus, like it is common in the literature (e.g., Mankiw et al., 1992; 
Islam, 1995; Caselli et al., 1996), the natural logarithm of the sum of agricultural employment 
growth and 0.05 (for constant technological progress and depreciation rate) is calculated for 
ln(l+a+d).  
We augment the model with a control variable measuring the effect of general economic 
reforms as well as with a measure of individualization.  Progress in general economic reforms   17
(REFORM) is measured (in natural logarithm) as the average of the EBRD indicators for price 
and trade liberalization, and small-scale privatization.
20  These indicators capture the 
extensiveness of the so-called “first phase” reforms, which are necessary condition for the 
successful implementation of institutional reforms.   
The extent of farm restructuring and individualization is measured by the share of TAL 
used in private (family) farms and household plots (INDIVID).
21  This is the variable of main 
interest in our analysis.  We use data from countries’ National Statistics and Macours and 
Swinnen (2000a) as the values are calculated in natural logarithms.   
Our maintained hypothesis is that the levels of INDIVID and REFORM induce resource 
reallocation and productivity shifts that importantly affect ALP.  Table 2 reports descriptive 
statistics of the regression variables.  
- Table 2 - 
 
5  Results and discussion 
Base and augmented specifications 
The results of the GMM-IV estimations based on the neo-classical growth model as specified 
in equation (2) are reported in table 3.  All regressions include time dummies (not reported), 
which were found to be jointly significant in every regression.  There is no second order 
serial correlation (the m2-test is fulfilled) and the Sargan test does not reject the validity of 
                                                 
20 See chapter 2 of the EBRD Transition Report 2002  (EBRD, 2002) for a detailed definition of these 
indicators.  
21 There is literature pointing out to initial disorganization effects of enterprise restructuring during transition 
(Blanchard and Kremer, 1997; Roland and Verdier, 1999).  By using levels of individualization rather than 
changes, we try to avoid capturing the initial disorganization of agricultural sectors due to the breakup of 
collective farms.     18
instruments in all specifications.  The left hand side variable is the yearly change in the 
natural logarithm of real per worker agricultural output (ALP).   
- Table 3 - 
First, a regression corresponding to the base specification neo-classical growth model 
was run; the results are presented in column (1).  All variables are significant at the one 
percent level and have the expected signs.  Results reported are under the assumption that 
right-hand site variables are predetermined.
22  The negative coefficient on initial ALP as in 
most published work is interpreted as conditional convergence while investment is positive 
and growth in employment is negative as suggested by the neo-classical growth model.  The 
implied speed of convergence, c is quite high at about seven percent per annum, not 
surprising for the case of economic transition.  It seems that the most important determinant 
of the growth in agricultural productivity is the reduction in excess labor.
23   
Next, we run regressions augmented with measures of progress in economic reforms 
and of individualization of agricultural production in order to assess their effects on 
productivity growth.  In column (2) results of an augmented version of the neo-classical 
growth model, with the measure of general economic reforms (REFORM), are reported.  The 
results of the base regression hold while the coefficient of the reform variable is significant at 
the five percent level and positive as expected.  REFORM is a synthetic indicator of reform 
policies adopted (and their outcomes) thus, measuring the advancement in general economic 
                                                 
22 Treating investment and employment growth rates as exogenous led to estimation failing the m2-test, which 
implies that in transition factor reallocation is indeed affected by transition-specific shocks such as reforms and 
enterprise restructuring.  Versions of regressions where investment and growth in employment are assumed 
endogenous were also run but the results were not significantly different from ones reported.  These alternative 
treatments are available upon request.   
23 Labor adjustment in transition is interpreted as an indicator of initial (passive) restructuring while active 
restructuring is defined as new investment (e.g., Coricelli and Djankov, 2001).   19
reforms.
24  As in other studies it is interpreted as an important condition for successful 
restructuring of the agricultural sector (Macours and Swinnen, 2000a, 2000b; Lerman, 2001).  
We recognize that the impact of reforms is affected by policy choices and initial conditions.  
It is not the goal of our analysis, however, to distinguish between these effects.  In the next 
section we (tentatively) analyze the direct impact of reform policies and initial conditions on 
productivity growth.  
Individualization of agricultural production is an important indicator of restructuring 
in agriculture.  It is the major outcome of the agriculture-specific land reform policies 
adopted.  Some countries adopted the restitution method (mainly Central European and 
Balkan countries, except Albania, Poland and Slovenia) while others distributed property 
rights through paper shares (CIS).  Albania stands out as the only country in our sample that 
followed the approach of distributing land in the form of physical plots.  Poland and Slovenia 
do not fall into any of these three categories because they started the transition with large 
proportions of land already in individual farms, and did not introduce any substantial land 
reform afterwards.  The importance of these land reform choices lies in the fact that they 
resulted in different magnitude of the shift of land to individual farming (INDIVID).  Thus by 
assessing the impact of individualization on productivity growth we can provide an implicit 
evaluation of the success of land reform policies adopted.   
Results in column (3) from estimating the neo-classical growth model augmented 
with INDIVID show that individualization is important for productivity growth.  The 
coefficients on the base variables are as in the previous model specifications, with respect to 
sign and magnitude while the coefficient on the individualization variable is positive and 
significant at the one percent level.  This result is important because we find a positive effect 
                                                 
24 All specification tests, in this and in the following specifications, are satisfied if regression variables are 
treated as predetermined.    20
of individualization in a dynamic model controlling for investment and changes in 
employment, which are the most important factor of the agricultural sector transformation 
during the period of analysis.
25   
In column (4) we report results from a neo-classical growth model specification 
augmented with both REFORM and INDIVID.  Again the results from the base specification 
are maintained and the impact of both REFORM and INDIVID is positive and significant.  
The speed of conditional convergence, c has doubled when both economic reforms and 
restructuring of farms through individualization are implemented.  The results are robust to 
alternative treatment of INDIVID and REFORM as predetermined or endogenous.   
 
“Implied” country productivity: A tentative analysis 
Panel-data technique permits besides controlling for the (unobservable) individual country 
effects in the estimation of the parameters of main interests in our analysis, specifically the 
coefficient on INDIVID, to also obtain estimates of these effects themselves.  Following the 
approach in Islam (1995), we use the consistent GMM-IV estimates  * ˆ β  and γˆ (column 1 of 
table 3) to calculate the “implied” country productivity factor,  i A ˆ  that corresponds to lnA(t), 
in the notation of section 3.  Thus,  ) 1 /( ) ˆ * ˆ ( ˆ
1 ,
c
i i i i e x q q A
−
− − − − = γ β , where  i q ,  1 ,− i q , and  i x  
are averages taken over the entire period of analysis.   
The  i A ˆ  productivity factor is a measure of efficiency with which countries have been 
transforming their capital and labor resources into output over the period of analysis; the 
                                                 
 
25 Assessing the sensitivity of this result to alternative assumptions about endogeneity of the individualization 
variable showed that results reported are robust.  Nevertheless, with respect to the importance of the impact of 
individualization a caveat must be made that despite robust our results are based on proxies for investment and 
technological progress.    21
values of  i A ˆ  are reported in Appendix 1.  It is reassuring that our results are similar in 
magnitude to estimated productivity factors in Islam (1995), for the “emerging markers” 
group of countries.
26  Furthermore, the ranking of the estimates corresponds well to the 
perceived level of development (productivity) of the countries analyzed.  Thus, CEE and 
Baltic countries are characterized by higher efficiency in comparison with Balkan and CIS 
countries.  Exception worth mentioning is the relatively low  i A ˆ  value for Poland, which 
suggests potential problems with respect to agricultural-sector competitiveness of this country 
in light of the forthcoming EU accession.   
For the purposes of our analysis it is important to look at the determinants and 
implications of the estimated lnA(t).  First of all A(t) is a part of the production function and 
hence it should be correlated with the output levels of the countries.  To check this we plot in 
figure 1a the relationship between  i A ˆ  and  i q  which show close association; the simple 
correlation coefficient is 0.88.   
- Figure 1 - 
Next we explore to what extent is  i A ˆ  important in explaining growth.  According to 
the neo-classical growth model, steady state growth is given by the exogenous rate of 
technological progress.  Hence, our focus here is on growth in transition and how does  i A ˆ  
affect transition growth.  According to the model countries move towards their respective 
steady states and lnA(t) is one of the variables explaining the dynamics around steady state 
(see equation (2)).  It can be shown that other things equal, the distance between the steady 
state and initial level of output increases with the increase in lnA(t) and other way round, the 
                                                 
26 It should be noted that the estimates in Islam (1995) refer to productivity factors of whole countries while our 
estimates correspond to productivity factors of agricultural sectors only, in the respective transition countries, 
and cover different time-period.    22
more distant a country is from its steady state, the higher the growth rate (see Islam, 1995).  
Hence, there should be a positive relationship between the observed output growth rates and 
i A ˆ .  Figure 1b confirms this assertion; the simple correlation coefficient is 0.65.   
The above analysis shows that higher values of lnA(t) are associated with both higher 
levels of productivity and higher growth rates.  The important question then is what the 
determinants of growth in lnA(t) are.
27  In order to evaluate the impact of country-specific 
observed characteristics, zi on productivity growth,  i A ˆ ∆  (see Appendix 1) we can use OLS 
level estimation:  *) * ( ˆ
i i i i v z A ε δ + + = ∆ , where νi* and εi* are unobserved country-specific 
effects and the error term of the auxiliary regression, respectively.  However, OLS will 
generate a consistent estimate of δ iff all zi characteristics are uncorrelated with νi* which is a 
very strong assumption.  Therefore we cannot attach much casual significance to the estimate 
δˆ, and proceed by simply two-way plotting the relationships of interest.   
Natural candidates in analyzing transition countries are reform and restructuring 
variables as well as initial conditions.  First, in figures 2a and 2b, we plot the relationships of 
i A ˆ ∆  with REFORM and INDIVID, respectively.  The simple correlation coefficients are 
quite high, 0.49 and 0.58, respectively, which confirm the findings from our regression 
analysis in the previous section.  It does seem that individualization of agricultural production 
(and general economic reforms) stimulate productivity not only by inducing efficient 
reallocation of capital and labor but also by shifting upwards the efficiency of resource 
utilization.   
- Figure 2 - 
                                                 
27 We calculated the growth in lnA(t),  i A ˆ ∆ , as the difference between  i A ˆ s estimated at the beginning (1990) and 
at the end (2000) of the period of analysis (see also equation (2)).  Results are reported in Appendix 1.    23
Finally, we address the issue of the impact of initial conditions on productivity growth.  
Country-specific time-invariant characteristics are eliminated in the first differenced GMM-IV 
estimator, as it can be seen in equation (5).  However, as it was shown, the lnA(t) term embodies 
the effects of the country-specific characteristics and therefore it is interesting to see if initial 
conditions affect  i A ˆ ∆ ; note that  i A ˆ ∆  is calculated on the basis of equation (4).  The (observed) 
initial conditions are measured by two synthetic indexes, which summarize a number of 
variables describing the status of former socialist countries’ economies at the beginning of 
transition (see Appendix 1).
28  The first index (IC1) can be interpreted as a measure of inherited 
distortions.  Positive values of this index indicate lower initial distortions.  The second initial 
conditions’ index (IC2) captures the degree of development of the economy.  Higher values of 
this index characterize countries with higher initial development and thus better initial 
conditions.   
Previous studies (e.g., Macours and Swinnen, 2000a, 2000b; Falcetti et al., 2002) 
have emphasized the importance of initial conditions in determining countries’ performance 
during transition.  Their results show that the impact of initial conditions is stronger with 
respect to gross output while it is vague with respect to labor productivity and running mostly 
through the effects of reform policies.  Our results of plotting  i A ˆ ∆  on the initial conditions, 
IC1 and IC2 (see figures 3a and 3b, respectively) show that initial conditions do not directly 
affect productivity growth in any significant way.  The simple correlation coefficients are 
low, 0.27 and 0.25, respectively.
29  To check if initial conditions played more significant role 
                                                 
 
28 These indexes are based on a principal component analysis of a number of general and agricultural sector-specific 
variables.  See Box 2.1 of the EBRD Transition Report 1999 (EBRD, 1999) for similar calculations and more 
details.  
29 Plotting the REFORM variable on IC1 and IC2 shows that the impact of initial conditions on ALP is indirect 
and runs through the impact of the reforms adopted.  Specifically, the correlation of REFORM and IC1 
measuring inherited distortions is particularly high, at 0.68.  This result is similar to findings in Macours and 
Swinnen (2001b).    24
during the first five years of transition we also calculated  i A ˆ ∆  for only the first five-year 
period.  The correlation of  i A ˆ ∆  with IC1 and IC2 again prove d  t o  b e  l o w ;  c o r r e l a t i o n  
coefficients were 0.32 and 0.28, respectively.   
- Figure 3 - 
 
6 Conclusion 
In this paper we address the question whether individualization of agricultural production as 
measured by the share of total agricultural land used in individual farms helps productivity of 
transition agriculture.  The main result that individualization does positively affect 
productivity growth is robust to alternative treatments with respect to endogeneity 
assumptions.  Advantage of our approach is that we analyze this relationship within the well-
defined theoretical framework of the neo-classical growth model.  Furthermore, using panel 
data and a first differenced GMM-IV estimator we are able to obtain consistent coefficient-
estimates, by controlling for endogeneity and unobserved country-specific effects, and to 
isolate the effects of capital and labor deepening on the one hand and technological and 
institutional changes on the other, in the process of transition.   
Our results have a number of important policy implications (keeping in mind the 
caveats made throughout the paper).  First, we cast light on an important institutional debate 
concerning the appropriateness of policies aiming at individualization of agricultural 
production in transition countries.  Applying a robust theoretical and empirical framework we 
are able to qualify so far inconclusive results of other studies (Macours and Swinnen, 2000a, 
2000b; Lerman, 2000, 2001) and prove that the shift to individual farming has had a positive 
impact on productivity growth in transition countries.  Second, investment and the reduction 
in excess labor, which are associated with active and initial (passive) restructuring,   25
respectively (Coricelli and Djankov, 2001) are found to be very important determinants of the 
productivity growth in transition agriculture.  Furthermore, resource reallocation is not 
exogenous but rather affected by reforms and enterprise restructuring, with a lag of a year or 
more.  Third, our study highlights the role of the country productivity factor, A(t) as a 
determinant of the efficiency with which factors of production are being converted into 
output.  Thus, improvements in A(t) brought about by appropriate reform measures (such as 
individualization of production) can have positive direct and indirect (via s and l rates) effects 
on productivity and incomes.  Finally, our analysis confirms previous findings (Macours and 
Swinnen, 2000a, 2000b; Falcetti et al., 2002) that general economic reforms positively affect 
productivity growth while the differences in initial conditions do not have significant direct 
impact throughout the transition period.     26
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Table 1 Land reforms, farm restructuring and the changes in agricultural indicators over the 1990–2001 period 
 




b  Land reform  Region Country 
ALP 
c  GAO 
d  Pre-reform 1995  2000  Progress  index 
e  Procedure 
f 
CEE Czech  Rep  170  73  1  21  26  90 R
 4 
Hungary  236  77 13  46 51  90  R 
Poland  88  92 76  82 84  90  - 
Slovakia  130 62 2  7 9  80  R 
Balkans Albania  110
1  116
1  3 96  90




2  14 51  56
2  80 R 
Romania  79  91 14  71 85  80  R 
Slovenia  115 117 83  93 94  90  - 
Baltics Estonia  138  42  4  53
3  61 90  R 
Latvia 64  38  4  80
3  89 90  R 
Lithuania 76  65  9  66  87  90  R 
CIS Belarus  85  57  7  11 14  20  DS
 6 
 Kazakhstan  72
2  56
2  0 5  24
1  50 DS 
Russia 69  62  2  9  13
1  50 DS 
Ukraine 54  55  6  16  18
1  60 DS 
Notes: 
a Cumulative index (1990=100); 
b Share of total agricultural land used in individual farms; 
c ALP = agricultural labor productivity; 
d GAO = gross agricultural output; 
eProgress index (max=100) of land reform; 
f Dominant form; 
1 Data for 1998; 
2 Data for 1999; 
3 Data for 1996; 
4 R = restitution; 
5 DP = distribution of plots; 
6 DS = distribution 
of shares.  
Sources: EBRD, FAO, ILO, National Statistics, WB 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics of the regression variables by country 
 
Variables
  Region Country 










CEE Czech  Rep  5.32 18530.87  11.63  -8.48  15.42  3.31 
Hungary 8.58  10031.14  16.01  -11.18  34.93  3.37 
Poland -1.48  6079.18  17.41  -0.42  80.00  3.52 
Slovakia  2.66  8764.09  12.86 -7.47 5.50 3.30 
Balkans Albania  1.17  3381.08  18.47  0.67  65.62  2.97 
Bulgaria -5.33  6840.50  11.92  0.87  37.45  2.78 
Romania -2.34  6786.30  12.97  1.42  61.30  2.72 
Slovenia 1.37  10741.11  16.47  0.24  89.09  3.53 
Baltics Estonia  3.24  7997.83  15.83  -11.92  49.89  3.04 
Latvia -5.92  8490.59  9.76  -2.70  73.68  2.97 
Lithuania -2.73  8367.27  8.90  -1.62  67.11  2.98 
CIS Belarus  -1.76 5675.12  16.94  -4.46  11.05  1.64 
 Kazakhstan  -3.59  5061.88 9.89 -2.77 4.19 2.52 
Russia  -4.13  7391.19 8.52 -1.50 8.19 2.67 
Ukraine -6.07  7191.80  9.79  0.03  13.85  2.16 
Notes: All figures are annual averages over the period of analysis; the number of observations is 107 for 15 countries.  
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Table 3 GMM-IV neo-classical growth model estimations 
 
Dependent variable: ALP growth  




























lnREFORM -    0.0686 
(0.0319)
** -   0.0654 
(0.0343)
* 





m1  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
m2  0.13 0.13 0.16 0.15 
Sargan  test  0.87 0.96 0.90 0.90 
Notes: Standard errors robust to general heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses under the coefficients; 
***, ** and * denote 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level of significance, respectively; for m1 and m2 and the Sargan test p-
values of the null hypothesis for valid specification are reported; the number of observations is 107 for 15 
countries.  
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Appendix 1 “Implied” productivity factors and initial conditions by country 
 
Variables
  Region Country  Code 
A ˆ   A ˆ ∆ , %  IC1 IC2 
CEE Czech  Rep  CZ  9.59  34.71  1.11  1.16 
 Hungary  HU  8.21  34.47  1.90  1.01 
 Poland  PL  5.52  15.36  1.54  0.61 
 Slovakia  SK  7.37  11.89  0.99  0.95 
Balkans Albania  AL  4.88  32.58  0.47  -1.45 
 Bulgaria  BG  5.76  23.00  0.79  0.82 
 Romania  RO  5.66  48.32  0.87  0.40 
 Slovenia  SL  6.81  71.98  1.04  0.98 
Baltics Estonia  ES  7.47  67.78  -0.80  0.84 
 Latvia  LA  6.96  23.54  -0.84  1.15 
 Lithuania  LI  6.79  30.24  -0.54  1.04 
CIS Belarus  BR  5.64  -2.83  -0.80  0.94 
 Kazakhstan  KZ  4.67  -23.72  -0.90  -0.62 
 Russia  RU  6.18  25.48  -0.59  0.80 
 Ukraine  UR  6.01  22.55  -0.70  0.67 
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